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To the Editor,  
Submitted for your consideration is an original manuscript entitled “Industry interests in 
gambling research: Lessons learned about other forms of hazardous consumption”.  This 
paper is being submitted for consideration with Addictive Behaviors.  
The focus of the paper is on the risks of industry funding for gambling research, which is 
framed by literature on usages of research to influence policy by the tobacco and alcohol 
industries. The context is strong concern about the high levels of industry involvement in 
gambling research (particularly in the UK, where an industry sponsored organisation is the 
main commissioner of relevant research on behalf of government), but also recent papers 
written by researchers with industry connections which have downplayed or dismissed the 
risks of industry linkages.  
 
One such paper was published recently in the journal International Gambling Studies (which 
itself has strong industry connections at the editorial level) which dismisses concerns about 
industry influences on gambling research, as well as the relevance of literature on tobacco 
and alcohol industries. The first author on this submission wrote a letter to the editor in 
response to this paper, and have developed this into the current full-length article. 
 
The letter to the editor can be found here: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14459795.2017.1321682?journalCode=rigs20 
 
We are aware of no other paper that provides an accessible synthesis of wider literature on 
the tactics of tobacco and alcohol industries, and has drawn parallels with practices of the 
gambling industry. We believe that this paper is extremely important for increasing 
awareness of the risks of industry funding for gambling research, and allowing researchers 
and policy makers to make informed decisions about engaging with the gambling industry.  
Both authors on this manuscript have approved this version for submission, and can confirm 
manuscript has not been submitted for publication elsewhere.  
Contact details for correspondence regarding the proposed manuscript are as follows: 
 
Dr Sean Cowlishaw,  
School of Social and Community Medicine, 
University of Bristol, 
Bristol, BS8 2PS 
United Kingdom   
 
Email: sean.cowlishaw@bristol.ac.uk  
Phone +44 1173 314 515 
 
We look forward to hearing from you or one of your Associates in due course. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Sean Cowlishaw and Samantha Thomas 
Cover Letter
 
To the Editorial Team,  
Addictive Behaviors, 
 
We appreciate your consideration of our submission entitled ‘Industry interests in gambling 
research: Lessons learned about other forms of hazardous consumption’. We are grateful for 
the feedback and opportunity to respond to comments from the reviewers. I have copied 
these comments below (in bold), followed by our responses.  
 
Reviewers' comments: 
 
Reviewer #1:  
 
This is a potentially valuable paper which shows significant similarities between 
industry approaches across harmful products, presents some lessons to be learned 
by those working on gambling, and offers helpful conclusions for both those working 
to reduce gambling harms and researchers in the area. 
 
Given recent developments in relation to different forms of gambling, the paper would 
be particularly time. This reviewer would be keen to see it published, albeit with some 
amendments to address issues raised as below.  
 
While a number of these are listed, they mainly suggest wording changes and other 
minor edits or suggestions: hence the recommendation is for "Minor Revision" only. 
For the minor/wording edits, I would suggest that the authors do not need to set out 
in detail ways in which they have responded. 
 
For the sake of completeness, we have provided brief indications of responses to each 
suggestion. 
  
Some of the wording is a little loose. For example, the title would better read "…. 
Lessons learned from other forms of hazardous consumption…." than "about"; and in 
the "highlights" section, "awareness" might be better than "recognition".  
 
Wording in the title and the highlights section has been revised as suggested.  
 
Further notes raising similar editorial suggestions follow on a section-by section 
basis. 
 
Abstract 
 
"….. engineering of evidence" - suggest "engineering of evidence among other 
approaches". 
 
"It then reviews emerging evidence…" - suggest "it then reviews both earlier and 
emerging evidence…". 
 
The abstract has been revised in accordance with the suggestion. 
 
Background 
 
"relative to…"- I think the authors here are trying to make the point that the burdens 
may be similar to those from smoking and alcohol use. If so, "comparable" may be 
better - although this point needs to be made with some care. Suggest "comparable in 
*Response to Reviewers
some regards…". The reference here (6) seems to be specifically about alcohol rather 
than in relation to the point made. 
 
We have revised the wording as suggested. We have also included a reference which 
reports the comparison across burdens attributable to gambling and alcohol misuse (along 
with other health-related conditions).  
 
"Notwithstanding" is the wrong word in this context (would require additional wording 
to make sense). Suggest "nonetheless". 
 
We have revised the wording as suggested. 
 
"Health risks from studies" - surely not from the studies themselves? Suggest minor 
edit. 
 
We have made an insertion and now refer to “indirect public health risks from studies”. We 
believe that this is a reasonable interpretation for studies that may be used to help subvert 
policies that would otherwise reduce gambling-related harms.  
 
Hazardous consumptions and conflicts of interest 
 
"goals of public health promotion" - suggest "goals of public health" 
 
We have revised the wording as suggested. 
 
"for example, US studies suggest around 10% of adult drinkers that are problem 
drinkers…." - Needs minor edit. The authors may also wish to consider use of the 
term "problem drinkers" given that many problems attributed to alcohol arise from 
used by those who might not be considered "problem drinkers" - although this may 
be an issue for another paper considering industry preferences for terms such as 
"problem drinkers" and "problem gamblers" to minimise concerns. 
"But who still account for" should read "but still account for". 
 
We share concern about uses of the term ‘problem drinking’ to minimize concerns about 
alcohol consumption, and make a similar point in this paper about usages of the term 
‘problem gambling’. However, we believe that it would be more suitable to address this 
concern (as relates to alcohol) at a later point of the article. As such, and while we recognize 
that other psychiatric nomenclature is associated with similar concerns, we have endeavored 
to avoid the issue here by (a) revising the wording as suggested, and (b) changing the term 
‘problem drinkers’ to those that ‘exhibit abusive and dependent drinking’ (the latter of which 
is consistent with the referenced paper). Later in the paper we provide a footnote which 
addresses the usage of the term ‘problem drinking’ to support industry messaging that 
alcohol-related harms are confined to small numbers of drinkers.  
 
In addition to these changes, we have also provided more detail about age differences 
reported in the reference paper, and corrected an erroneous figure which was based on a 
secondary citation we had referred to in an earlier draft of the manuscript.  
 
"While most consumers do not experience problems or addiction….": I have some 
concerns here. First the issue raised above - many consumers may experience 
problems even if not falling into categories defined by industry or others as 
"problem" consumers; second, this does not apply to smoking, where upwards of 
50% of regular consumers will die because they smoked (two thirds in Australia). 
Suggest some re-wording of this and the next sentence. 
 
As noted, we have endeavored to avoid concerns about this terminology and have also 
made modifications here. Sentences have thus been changed (a) from ‘while most 
consumers do not experience problems or addiction’ to ‘while most consumers would not be 
classified as exhibiting severe problems or dependence’, and (b) from ‘problematic 
consumers’ to ‘people exhibiting problems’. We have also inserted a footnote to indicate that 
this does not apply to smoking.  
 
Tobacco research….. 
 
"Encompassing a view of corporations as disease vectors" - suggest "encompassing 
a view of some corporations…." (Otherwise the implication is that this applies to all 
corporations in any area.) 
 
We have revised the wording as suggested. 
 
"Erosions of freedoms by a 'nanny state'." Not quite accurate: the term "nanny state" 
is now much used by harmful industries and their supporters, but while coined in the 
1950s, has only come into such prominence relatively recently.  
 
We have removed reference to the term ‘nanny state’. 
 
"Notwithstanding the negative impacts…." - Suggest "notwithstanding the many 
direct and indirect harms, from premature mortality and morbidity to the negative 
impacts of passive smoking…" 
 
We have revised the wording as suggested. 
 
"Studies yielding conflicting results…." - Suggest, "studies designed to yield results 
conflicting with  evidence accepted by governments and health authorities…." 
 
We have revised the wording as suggested. 
 
"Notwithstanding" - as above. 
 
We have replaced ‘notwithstanding’ with ‘nonetheless’.  
 
Following in their footsteps 
 
"policies agreed by developed countries". That is wrong - the FCTC and its policies 
have been accepted by many more (including many low and middle-income countries) 
- it has been ratified by 181 countries. 
 
We have revised the sentence which now reads ‘policies agreed by more than 180 
countries’. 
 
"That formally excludes industry…." - As precision is important here, suggest using a 
specific quotation from Article 5.3 and/or the Guidelines (e.g. the statement in the 
Guidelines that there is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the 
interests of the tobacco industry and public health interests.). 
 
We have inserted some specific quotations from Guidelines regarding implementation of 
Article 5.3 of the Convention.  
 
"produced by lawsuits" - suggest here "as in the case of tobacco produced from 
litigation and media investigations" (references could be added here to the recent 
Reuters and Guardian exposes). 
 
We have revised the wording and made insertions as suggested. 
 
"Including substantial industry representation" - suggest "including substantial direct 
and indirect….". 
 
We have made this insertion as suggested.  
 
"Emphasising individual responsibility or problem drinking…." - see comments 
above. Perhaps this could be addressed at least in part by putting "problem drinking" 
within quote marks throughout, maybe with an initial reference to industry usage. 
 
We have inserted a footnote here to indicate that the term ‘problem drinking’ also support 
industry messaging that alcohol-related harms are confined to small numbers of drinkers. 
 
"The International Centre for Alcohol Policies" - "was", not "is" (it has been replaced 
by a similar organisation with a different name. 
 
We have replaced ‘was’ with ‘is’. 
 
"mirror WHO reports" - suggest "seek to mirror…". 
 
We have made this modification as suggested, and have changed expression from present 
to past tense.  
 
"The lessons learned about the tobacco industry….has provided…" - should be "have 
provided". 
 
To reduce words, we have removed reference to the tobacco industry here.  
 
"As such, the WHO has expressed a position that industry should have no role in the 
formulation of alcohol policies…". i) "as such" has no meaning, ii) more important, 
this is not a formal WHO position. The sentence would more accurately read, "In 2013 
the Director General of WHO expressed the view that….". 
 
We have changed the sentence as suggested. 
 
Industry interests in gambling research 
 
"Notwithstanding" - as above. 
 
We have replaced ‘notwithstanding’ with ‘nonetheless’. 
 
"These have also described biases….." - I understand what this sentence is trying to 
say, but it could be more clearly expressed. 
 
The sentence has been revised and now reads: ‘These narrative accounts have also 
suggested biases….’. 
 
"Notwithstanding commercial linkages, GambleAware has a formal role…" - excellent 
use of "notwithstanding" (!) - but needs reference for the government association. 
 
We have inserted a supporting reference and clarified that the association with government 
is via the industry regulator and a separate advisory board. 
 
"There also continues to be much less public money for gambling research, relative 
to tobacco and alcohol (the latter of which is itself underfunded)……". Two 
observations here: first, the experience of this reviewer (and researcher) is that much 
more funding is available for alcohol research than for tobacco - although for both 
over the years funding for research addressing areas such as treatment and 
cessation has been much more in evidence than funding for research addressing 
prevention in general and commercial vectors in particular; second, I'm not sure that 
it is helpful to make comparisons with two other areas where potentially useful 
research is underfunded. It may be more appropriate to place the lack of funding for 
gambling research in the context of limited funding for prevention research in 
general, and the funding available for other forms of health/medical research. 
 
We have removed the direct comparisons across levels of funding for gambling, alcohol and 
tobacco research. 
 
"Difficulties accessing gambling data…." - This used to be an approach cited by 
researchers working in tobacco.  
 
We have changed reference from ‘greater’ to ‘very high’ (thus also removing any 
comparison). 
 
Conclusions 
 
"all industry representatives…. being excluded" - suggest "being excluded from any 
role in….". 
 
We have made the insertion as suggested. 
 
Although not a report about alcohol or tobacco (or gambling), in noting the value of 
learning from other areas the authors may somewhere in the body of the text wish to 
use a phrase from the 2014 McKinsey Global Institute report on Obesity ("Overcoming 
obesity: An initial economic analysis" - where they include "Logic based on parallel 
evidence" - in the context of their report, this related to lessons for obesity from areas 
like tobacco, but it may be a useful phrase to incorporate somewhere in the 
discussion). 
 
We agree that this is a useful phrase and have incorporated this at two points in the paper 
(initially regarding obesity / nutrition research and then again in the conclusions).  
 
Reviewer #2 
 
The authors have produced a well written manuscript, highlighting some important 
issues in relation to industry involvement in gambling research. Drawing on 
experiences from the alcohol and tobacco field, this article serves as a brief and 
engaging cautionary tale for those working in the gambling field. However, it is this 
sense of being a cautionary tale which I find problematic. My view is that the authors 
have not answered the really big question posed by their own review and discussion, 
which is 'what can we do?'. There have been many, many opinion pieces and reviews 
of this kind published in the alcohol and tobacco field, all of which draw similar 
conclusions - industry involvement in anything is bad for public health and research, 
there are lots of ways in which industry influences policy to its own advantage, and 
we need to be cautious of this. 
 
Unfortunately, a paper of this kind, in its current format, does little to advance our 
understanding of the problems in gambling, beyond reiterating opinions shared by 
many other researchers (throughout numerous published works cited by the authors 
here). Nor does the paper offer any concrete way forward to avoid the pitfalls of 
tobacco industry manipulation, and more recent concerns around the alcohol 
industry's lobbying activity. 
 
The danger is that publications of this kind fall in to the trap of sounding like a council 
of academic despair - 'why won't the government ignore industry with all its vested 
interests and just do what we say?'. Minimum unit pricing is a clear example of when 
the scientific evidence is as clear as it ever will be (short of the time when MUP is, 
hopefully, introduced and we can see whether the scientific predictions are correct), 
but the political will to act on this is lacking in England, and in Scotland the initiative 
is tied up in litigation with the industry. So I ask again - what do the authors suggest 
we do, other than just to be cautious? 
 
We agree that the question of ‘what can we do’ is important, and had attempted to address 
this in several ways. Our paper reflects the assumption that limited understanding of 
practices of hazardous consumption industries, and scant awareness of the risks of 
relationships with commercial bodies, are contributing to the high levels of industry 
involvement in gambling research. As such, the paper is itself intended to improve 
recognition of these concerns and contribute towards informed responses to industry funding 
for gambling research. Furthermore, in the conclusion section we had also indicated a range 
of things that should be done including (a) direct studies of gambling industry practices, (b) 
increasing funding for gambling research, (c) implementing credible structures for protecting 
research commissioning from the interests of private companies, and (d) developing suitable 
models of engagement with the gambling industry to guide researchers.  
 
There are already papers which are singularly focused on proposing additional responses to 
industry funding for gambling research (e.g., via development of codes of conduct or 
charters for practice), and we believe that additional discussion is out of scope of this brief 
paper that aims to increase familiarity with tactics of hazardous consumption industries, and 
substantiate concerns about the gambling industry. Nonetheless, we respectfully disagree 
with the assessment that these aims do little themselves to advance understanding of 
problems in the gambling field. While we cite papers which have also expressed concerns 
about the gambling industry, the number of such papers is small and none have provided an 
accessible synthesis of literature on tactics of hazardous consumption industries, or outlined 
the parallel practices of the gambling industry (which we believe is an important device for 
substantiating concerns). Furthermore, we disagree that there is sufficient or widespread 
acceptance of the actual need for developing responses to industry funding for gambling 
research. This is illustrated by a recent article from senior researchers (who have declared 
industry linkages) in a specific gambling journal (that also include industry sponsored 
researchers at the senior editorial level), that has attempted to marginalize concerns about 
the gambling industry as unfounded conspiracy theories. See: 
 
Delfabbro D, King D. (2017). Gambling is not a capitalist conspiracy theory: A critical 
commentary of literature on the ‘industry state gambling complex’. International Gambling 
Studies, 17, 317-31.  
 
In this context, we believe that the current paper which also links observations of the 
gambling industry with a larger body of mainstream evidence about industry practices is 
timely, and provides critical support for approaches to responding to such concerns 
described elsewhere. 
 
Nonetheless, and given this feedback from the reviewer, we have made the following 
changes to the manuscript: 
- We have removed references to a ‘cautionary perspective’ in both the highlights 
section and conclusions.  
- In the conclusions section, we have directly addressed the contrast between our 
conclusions and recent attempts to discount concerns about influences of the 
gambling industry on research. 
- In this section, we have also discussed some initiatives which have been proposed in 
response to industry influences on gambling research. 
- In the conclusions section, we have also expanded our discussion to (a) establish the 
need for additional work to develop suitable models of engagement with the gambling 
industry that can guide researchers, and (b) more clearly identify a systematic 
framework for appraising factors that can be used by researchers to determine the 
hazardous of industry relationships.  
 
We would also strongly welcome the submission of a commentary or response to this paper 
that raises this question and provides a further opportunity to publicly engage with this issue.  
 
In addition to these changes, we have also edited the paper thoroughly to maintain brevity. 
However, given that most of the reviewer comments suggested insertions to the paper 
(particularly quotations from the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control), with few 
exclusions, the word count remains at 3,648 which is slightly above the usual word limit for 
this journal. 
 Highlights 
 There is growing concern about industry influences on gambling research, but also 
proponents of commercial involvement who downplay the risks and potential 
negative consequences. This paper examines such concerns in the context of evidence 
about other hazardous consumption industries. 
 The paper reviews literature on tobacco and alcohol industries, which documents the 
usages of research to manufacture doubt and divert attention away from roles of 
hazardous consumptions in producing harms. It highlights ways in which industry can 
exert control over research and mask involvement through ‘third-party’ organisations. 
 Although there is less awareness of practices of the gambling industry, there is 
preliminary evidence of analogous influences on the agenda for gambling research 
and use of third-party techniques. The paper provides examples from the UK context, 
which is characterised by particularly high levels of industry involvement in gambling 
research.  
 Indications of parallel practices across industries provide grounds for strong concern 
about commercial influences on gambling research, and support precautionary 
approaches to vested interests. 
*Highlights (for review)
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VESTED INTERESTS IN GAMBLING RESEARCH 
 
Abstract 
Research indicates that the evidential bases for many harm reduction policies 
targeting hazardous consumptions (including tobacco, alcohol and gambling) have 
been distorted by commercial industries that derive revenue from such commodities. 
These distortions are best illustrated by research on tobacco and alcohol, which 
indicates similar tactics used by industries to determine favourable policy 
environments through engineering of evidence, among other approaches. Although 
there is concern that gambling research is similarly vulnerable to commercial 
interests, the relevant literature lags far behind other fields and the aim of this paper is 
to increase familiarity with tactics used by industries for influencing research. It 
summarises the conceptual and empirical bases for expecting conflicts between goals 
of public health and companies that profit from hazardous consumptions. It also 
summarises evidence describing practices deployed by tobacco corporations, which 
include third-party techniques and the selective funding of research to manufacture 
doubt and deflect attention away from the consequences of smoking. It then reviews 
both early and emerging evidence indicating similar strategies used by alcohol 
industry, and uses this literature to view practices of the gambling industry. It argues 
that parallels regarding selective funding of research and third-party techniques 
provide grounds for strong concern about commercial influences on gambling 
research, and implementation of precautionary approaches to management of vested 
interests. 
 
Keywords: gambling, tobacco, alcohol, industry, vested interests  
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1.0  Background 
Recent decades have been characterised by expansions in the availability of 
gambling products and services [1-4], which have provided for growth in 
participation and behaviours that precede gambling-related harms [5]. These 
contribute towards substantial burdens on public health, which are comparable in 
some regards to other hazardous or addictive behaviours (e.g., alcohol use) [6] that 
are indicated targets for harm reduction policies [7]. However, research indicates that 
the evidence underlying many such policies has been distorted by commercial 
industries that derive revenue from these commodities [8]. Although literature on 
gambling lags far behind other hazardous consumptions, there is concern that relevant 
research is similarly vulnerable to commercial interests [9-12].  Nonetheless, there are 
proponents of industry involvement who dismiss the broader literature [13] and argue 
that gambling is distinguished by industry control over venues and data, which 
necessitates partnership with corporations [14, 15]. However, such arguments 
downplay and sometimes ignore the risks and negative consequences of industry 
influences. These include threats to the integrity of research and to researchers who 
are vulnerable to reputational damage, as well as indirect public health risks from 
studies that may (unintentionally or not) help subvert policies that would reduce 
gambling harms [16]. 
It is important that researchers and policy makers make informed decisions 
about engagement with the gambling industry, and the purpose of this paper is to 
outline literature on tactics used by hazardous consumption industries for influencing 
research. It will focus mainly on practices deployed by tobacco corporations, and will 
also describe evidence about strategies adopted by other (e.g., alcohol) industries. 
This literature will be used to frame concerns about the gambling industry.  
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2.0 Hazardous consumptions and conflicts of interest 
There are long-standing public health concerns about practices of industries of 
hazardous consumption [8, 16], which include tobacco, alcohol, ultra-processed foods 
and gambling. Underlying these concerns are conflicts between goals of public health 
and the economic objectives of companies that profit from consumption. These 
conflicts are arguably greatest when commodities possess addictive potential, given 
that individuals experiencing harm or addiction will typically engage in greatest levels 
of consumption and expenditure. For example, US studies suggest around 10% of 
adult drinkers (> 21 years) and 26% of youth (aged 12-20) that exhibit abusive and 
dependent drinking, but still account for 38% of expenditure on alcohol (due to 
consumption in greater quantities than drinkers who are not abusive or dependent) 
[17]. UK data suggests smaller numbers of people exhibiting moderate to severe 
problems with gambling (around 1-3%), but who account for up to 60% of gambling 
revenue, depending on type of activity [18]. Accordingly, it seems that while most 
consumers would not be classified as exhibiting severe problems or dependence
1
, 
those who do contribute disproportionate amounts towards industry revenue. This 
financial ‘surplus’ from people exhibiting problems [20] sets gambling, alcohol and 
tobacco apart from ordinary commodities, and provides incentives for industries to 
protect revenue by avoiding initiatives that reduce numbers consuming at high levels. 
3.0 Tobacco research and recognition of an industrial epidemic 
The consequences of conflicts between economic and public health agendas 
have been illustrated by internal documents from the tobacco industry, which were 
released following litigation against companies in the 1990s [21]. These documents 
provided data for emerging research on effects of corporate behaviours on health, 
                                                        
1
 This does not apply to smoking, where up to two thirds of smokers are expected to die because of 
their smoking behaviour [19].  
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which have been described in terms of ‘industrial epidemics’ (encompassing a view 
of some corporations as disease vectors that account for the spread of health-related 
conditions) [8]. Analyses of these documents indicated prevailing views within 
industry of threats to revenue from public health reforms, and concerted attempts to 
avoid actions that threatened financial interests (e.g., through legislative 
interventions) [22]. Many tactics had a public relations focus, and were intended to 
present smoking as a matter of individual choice and responsibility, while framing 
external regulation in terms of erosions of freedoms by the state. This is 
notwithstanding direct and indirect harms from smoking, ranging from mortality and 
morbidity to impacts on others from environmental smoke, and legitimate 
responsibilities of governments for protecting citizens from hazardous environments 
[23].  
Industry tactics included third-party techniques which involved 
commissioning of individuals or organisations to act on behalf of industry, while 
claiming independence and masking corporate involvement. For example, there was 
heavy investment in networks of paid scientific consultants [24], as well as contract 
research organisations and ‘think tanks’ that were commissioned to support industry 
positions [25]. These were additional to third-party front organisations [21], such as 
the Council for Tobacco Research and Center for Indoor Air Research, which were 
formed to promote messaging that hazards of smoking and environmental smoke, 
respectively, had not yet been proven [26]. A function of many such organisations 
was to fund research that seemed independent, but allowed industry to maintain 
control over evidence production. Industry representatives were involved in setting 
agendas and prioritised topics that served public relations objectives [26], and also 
influenced projects that received funding. For example, scientific advisory boards 
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were established to support claims of independence, but were selected due to 
scepticism about tobacco science and economic or personal relationships with 
industry [22]. Approval processes were subject to manipulation (e.g., through pre-
screening of funding applications, whereby some projects were excluded at early 
stages) [27], while there were requirements for industry representatives to edit 
publications and suppress or delay findings that were unfavourable [26].  
Industry documents indicate that funding research was a public relations 
strategy that supported claims of corporate responsibility and commitment to public 
health [26]. However, in the context of mounting evidence of health risks from 
smoking, the main goal was to manufacture a sense of controversy and doubt about 
independent evidence. This was through the generation of studies designed to yield 
results conflicting with evidence accepted by governments and health authorities, 
which were used to dispute evidence that smoking was harmful (for example, 
evidence reviews linked to industry were around 90 times less likely to conclude that 
passive smoking was harmful, when compared to independent evaluations) [28]. It 
was also through the selective commissioning of research on alternative causes of 
disease, including genetic factors, stress, and diet [21]. The latter were used to 
highlight factors that could confound associations with health. They also informed 
strategies for deflecting attention away from roles of smoking in cancer aetiology, and 
emphasising targets for intervention that would impact less on smoking and industry 
revenue [29]. 
A major component of industry tactics involved campaigns to influence policy 
debates through widespread dissemination of selective evidence [22]. For example, 
results from industry research were published across sponsored symposia proceedings 
and reports, and letters to the editor in academic journals [26]. Reports were rarely 
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subject to traditional peer review, and were associated with lower quality when 
compared to independent literature [26]. Nonetheless, such publications were cited 
heavily in media campaigns and submissions to government [30]. During 
consultations in 2011-12 about standardised packaging of tobacco products, for 
example, the UK government received many submissions linked to industry which 
involved heavy citation of sponsored reports [31]. Analyses indicate that these were 
not subject to traditional peer review in most instances, and supported assertions that 
standardised packaging would have no health benefits (which contrasts with 
independent evidence) [32]. Where peer reviewed articles were cited, these did not 
address the role of packaging in smoking, and rather, emphasised alternative drivers 
of behaviour and targets for intervention [31].As a result of analyses of tobacco 
industry documents, these subversive practices are recognised and there is consensus 
that the goals of tobacco corporations and public health are irreconcilable [8]. 
Accordingly, there are requirements for the protection of policy from vested interests 
which are agreed by more than 180 countries, and are based on the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control [33]. This is an international treaty that excludes 
industry from interactions with policy making and related activities. By way of 
illustration, the guidelines for implementation of the Convention include 
recommendations that Parties (referring to States and other entities bound by the 
treaty): 
“Should interact with the tobacco industry only when and to the extent strictly 
necessary to enable them to effectively regulate the tobacco industry and 
tobacco products” (p.7) [34]; and 
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“Should not accept, support or endorse the tobacco industry organizing, 
promoting, participating in, or performing, youth, public education or any 
initiatives that are directly or indirectly related to tobacco control” (p.7) [34]. 
These guidelines apply to officials, representatives and employees of any public or 
semi-public (or quasi-public) institution or body within the jurisdiction of a Party 
[34]. 
4.0 Following in their footsteps: Strategies of other industries of hazardous 
consumption 
In the absence of internal documents from other industries (as is the case of 
tobacco produced from litigation and media investigations) [35], there is less 
recognition of corporate practices and responses to health policies. However, there is 
evidence from alternative methodologies (e.g., analyses of public documents, 
stakeholder interviews) [36] which indicates that some such industries are adopting 
similar strategies in response to threats to financial interests. In relation to the alcohol 
industry, for example, there is evidence of substantial misrepresentation of 
independent research, and selective commissioning of studies to influence policy [37, 
38]. In the UK, this was illustrated during consultations about Minimum Unit Pricing 
(MUP); which is a price-based strategy for addressing alcohol problems which is 
supported by independent evidence, but opposed by many industry bodies [39]. 
Analyses of submissions to consultations with the Scottish Government in 2008 
indicated attempts by industry to misrepresent the evidence for MUP, and promote 
weak studies in favour of preferred policies (e.g., education or public information) 
[40]. One alcohol producer commissioned the think tank Demos to study the social 
aspects of binge drinking and influences of parenting. The latter coincided with the 
UK Government’s alcohol strategy in 2010, and informed campaigns to promote the 
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view that addressing parenting was a superior alternative to MUP [37]. The use of 
think tanks is a third-party practice of tobacco companies [25], and allows industry to 
draw on the perceived independence of organisations, while ensuring projects remain 
aligned with policy preferences of the funder [37].  
There is evidence of investment by the alcohol industry in third-party 
organisations, which have been labelled as ‘social aspects / public relations 
organisations’ (SAPROs) [41, 42]. These are characterised by funding from industry 
sources and trustee boards including direct and indirect industry representation. Some 
SAPROs focus on research and maintain scientific boards that support claims of 
independence [42]. However, these often comprise members with historical 
relationships with industry, and can have independence compromised in many ways 
(e.g., through receipt of honoraria and personal relationships with industry developed 
during sponsored events) [42]. These SAPROs have been observed to divert attention 
away from population-level interventions (e.g., regulating the price of alcohol) [43], 
and towards strategies emphasising individual responsibility or ‘problem drinking’2 
(which are among the least cost-effective strategies for addressing alcohol problems)
 
[7]. The International Centre for Alcohol Policies, for example, was an international 
SAPRO that worked to counter advice from the WHO (e.g., by producing reviews 
that sought to mirror WHO reports, but omitted evidence and reached opposite 
conclusions) [45]. In the UK, SAPROs include the Portman Group, which has a 
history of controversy including attempts to pay academics to write anonymous 
critiques of WHO reviews [42]. Drinkaware is another SAPRO which began as a 
website for the Portman Group and is now an ostensible platform for information and 
education about alcohol. However, the organisation remains funded by alcohol 
                                                        
2
  The focus on ‘problem drinking’ is also aligned with industry messaging that alcohol-related harms 
are confined to small numbers of drinkers, and support arguments against population-wide health 
policies that affect the ostensibly large majority of ‘moderate’ drinkers [44]. 
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producers and retailers and has been a vehicle for industry representation in research 
and policy debates (for example, Drinkaware also commissioned research on effects 
of parental drinking and was active in lobbying against MUP) [43].  
In the absence of legally required disclosures of internal documents, there is 
much about the nature of corporate influences on alcohol research that remains 
unclear. However, the high levels of commercial involvement in research has 
provided grounds for concern about attempts to subvert evidence underlying policy 
[36, 42]. In 2013, the Director General of the WHO expressed the view that industry 
should have no role in formulation of alcohol policies, which must be actively 
protected from commercial interests [46]. There are also arguments for adopting logic 
based on parallel evidence (e.g., relating to tobacco) [47] and precautionary 
approaches to protecting nutrition research, given that policy responses to obesity 
require reduced consumption of processed foods that are associated with high profit 
margins [48]. Such arguments are supported by reviews which indicate that articles on 
nutrition linked to industry are up to eight times more likely to reach conclusions that 
favour commercial sponsors, when compared to articles funded by other sources [49]. 
5.0 Industry interests in gambling research 
In the context of ongoing expansions in gambling technologies and industries, 
there has been less attention to industry practices and little systematic data is 
available. Nonetheless, there are growing concerns about commercial influences [9-
11], which mainly emphasise the impacts of funding on the agenda for research, and 
bias towards studies of problem gambling behaviours and pathologies (including 
appraisals of prevalence and interventions for problem or disordered gambling). Such 
concerns are supported by preliminary research comprising interviews with industry 
representatives, researchers and policy makers [50, 51]. These narrative accounts have 
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also suggested biases towards production of relatively ‘safe’ studies of problem 
gambling, and attributions of such to commercial interests of the gambling industry.  
Literature suggests at least two reasons why industry favoured research 
agendas prioritise studies of problem gambling. First is that such studies will 
underestimate the extent of harm from gambling. By way of illustration, research 
indicates only 15% of the total harm from gambling that is attributable to severe cases 
of problem gambling, with most harm linked to larger numbers exhibiting problems 
that are low to moderate in severity [6]. Harms from gambling also reflect impacts on 
other people (e.g., family members), and studies suggest greater numbers of 
households affected by gambling (around 11%) [52], relative to problem gambling 
rates among individuals (closer to 1%) [53]. Problem gambling research typically 
excludes these harms and supports arguments that consequences are confined to small 
numbers of people. This messaging has been observed in gambling industry 
documents [54, 55], and informs advocacy against population-level strategies that 
affect the supposedly large majority of individuals. This is analogous to ways in 
which the alcohol industry has argued that alcohol harms are limited to a minority of 
‘problem drinkers’, and thus opposed population-wide policies that threaten financial 
interests [44].  
Second is that studies which prioritise problem gambling direct attention 
towards individual determinants and indicators of harm, and away from the 
characteristics of gambling activities and environments. This is comparable to ways in 
which the tobacco industry sponsored research on contributions of genes and stress to 
cancer, and used these to minimise the role of smoking and suggest alternative targets 
for intervention [29]. By way of analogy, problem gamblers generally exhibit high 
levels of other psychiatric disorders [56], while studies suggest cognitive and 
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neurobiological mechanisms that are shared with comorbidities [57]. These findings 
emphasise psychiatric vulnerabilities to gambling problems and prioritise 
intrapersonal targets for intervention (e.g., through psychological or pharmacological 
therapies). Notwithstanding the value of such interventions, there are additional 
characteristics of gambling activities (e.g., stake size) and environments (e.g., 
advertising practices) that suggest population-level policies that could also improve 
well-being. However, in the context of scant public money for relevant research, it is 
likely that industry funding of research on individually-focussed interventions will 
over-populate the evidence-base that informs policy making. Assuming such 
interventions are also intended to have minimal impacts on revenue, then these may 
be weak or ineffective. In contrast, policies that could result in greater reductions in 
harm (and may help people who are not in contact with relevant services) will be 
subject to less consideration and delay. Similar strategies have been documented in 
relation to other industries and have enabled the delay of health innovations (e.g., 
standardised packing of tobacco products) [58]. 
Further parallels across industries relate to activities of third-party 
organisations and SAPROs. In the UK, for example, the Senet Group is funded by 
industry [59] and is comparable to the alcohol industry’s Portman Group. 
GambleAware is another third-party organisation which is advertised as an 
independent charity, but is funded by industry and includes representation from 
gambling and alcohol industries at trustee level [60]. Notwithstanding commercial 
linkages, GambleAware has a formal role in producing research on behalf of 
government (via the industry regulator) [61], and thus affords industry with routine 
involvement in evidence production. Although there have been no systematic 
evaluations of this evidence, there are indications of negative outcomes from situating 
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a commercially sponsored body as a commissioner of research. For example, a 
cursory examination of completed projects (excluding reviews and non-empirical 
activities) on the GambleAware website [62] indicates only 24 studies involving 
primary or secondary data (and thus small amounts of evidence in absolute terms), 
while almost 80% of projects (19/24) were awarded to contract research organisations 
or think tanks (consistent with tobacco and alcohol industry practices) [25, 37]. This 
is despite mechanisms that ostensibly support independence. These include a research 
committee comprising members with eminent reputations (but no domain expertise in 
gambling research), a research oversight panel including international researchers 
who have declared interests with the gambling industry, and a separate advisory body 
that determines priorities for large programmes (and also includes members who are 
beneficiaries of industry funding) [63]. Such ostensible ‘firewalls’ from industry 
characterise gambling SAPROs in other parts of the world (such as the National 
Centre for Responsible Gambling in the US), and have also been criticised for 
providing weak protections that benefit industry rather than research [64]. 
In the absence of substantial research on corporate practices, there is much 
about the nature of industry involvement in gambling research which remains unclear. 
However, there are reasons to suggest that this literature may be particularly 
vulnerable to vested influences. For example, while tobacco companies were forced to 
react to scrutiny following lawsuits, the alcohol and gambling industries have had 
advance opportunities to frame issues and normalise involvement in research. These 
have occurred in the absence of much recognition of the risks of such involvements, 
and organised responses from the public health field [65]. There also continues to be 
limited public money for gambling research, with scant funding expected to magnify 
distortions from selective commissioning of industry research [66]. Finally, the 
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gambling industry maintains high levels of control over access to gambling products 
and venues, and thus has additional means of influencing evidence by providing 
selective access. Difficulties accessing gambling data are provided as a reason for 
researchers to work in partnership with industry [14], but do not address the negative 
consequences of such partnerships. Alternative ways of overcoming these obstacles 
include policies requiring access to venues and data as a condition of licensing [10, 
51]. 
6.0 Conclusions 
Indications of parallel practices across hazardous consumption industries 
provide grounds for strong concern about commercial influences on gambling 
research. They contradict claims that such concerns comprise ‘conspiracy theories’ 
[13] which thus lack credible bases. However, there remains a need for further 
empirical analyses of gambling industry tactics, including through stakeholder 
interviews, documentary analyses of industry material, and systematic reviews 
comparing studies with and without commercial linkages. This also signals the need 
for increased public funding for gambling research, and development of credible 
structures to protect research from the economic interests of companies. Ostensibly 
independent research committees (situated within industry sponsored organisations) 
provide weak responses to vested interests, and stronger measures are required. These 
would involve all industry representatives (including third parties with industry 
relationships) being excluded from any role in determining priorities or 
commissioning studies on behalf of government or health agencies. Commissioning 
structures may comprise non-statutory bodies that are established and funded by 
government to produce research, and have no industry representation at any level of 
organisation. Such bodies should also be allowed maximum independence from 
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government, which are additional beneficiaries of gambling via taxation. These 
protections seem particularly important in countries where government is a supplier of 
gambling activities, and thus where lines with industry are blurred.  
This paper applies logic based on parallel evidence about tobacco and alcohol 
industries, and supports precautionary approaches to managing and responding to 
commercial interests in gambling research. These may include specific responses to 
industry influences that have been proposed recently, and comprise the development 
of codes of conduct for research on gambling and disclosure statements [10]. There 
should also be endeavours to develop and evaluate suitable models of engagement 
with industry that can guide gambling researchers. These have been discussed in the 
context of alcohol research [42, 67], and may extend from models of complete non-
engagement (assuming that economic interests of industry are incompatible with 
public health) to active collaboration with conflict of interest declarations. In between 
are models of ‘conditions of cooperation’ under which relationships with industry 
may be acceptable versus hazardous. Adams [16], for example, provides a useful 
framework for appraising factors that determine hazards of industry relationships, and 
include the extent of funding and nature of linkages (e.g., direct versus indirect). 
Considerations also comprise the degree of divergence between purposes of industry 
(e.g., to maximise profits) and research (e.g., to enhance public health), and the extent 
of relevant harms. The latter acknowledges varying consequences from different 
forms of consumption (for example, high intensity gambling machines are generally 
associated with greater harms than low intensity activities), but can be broadened to 
include impacts on the information environment that informs policy making. In the 
UK, for example, decisions to engage with industry help sustain a system that affords 
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routine commercial influences on evidence production, and researchers should 
consider the likely consequences for public health.
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